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5.1    Introduction
According to Franchise Times, the 200 largest U.S.- based franchise chains 
in 2004 operated 356,361 outlets and generated a total of 327,058 million 
U.S. dollars in sales worldwide. Of these, eighty-  six were fast-  food chains, 
operating a total of 180,772 outlets and generating sales of 162,409 million 
U.S. dollars. The largest franchise chain in the world in 2004 was  McDonald’s, 
with 30,220 outlets worldwide and total sales of 45,932 million U.S. dollars. 
The international fast- food industry is important, however, not only because 
of its sheer size, but because of the role it plays in the daily lives of consumers 
worldwide. Many fast-  food brands are among the best recognized brands 
around the world, and fast food is a very visible part of the global economy. 
Another fact that make these chains particularly interesting is that they 
produce basically the same output using the same technology in all their 
outlets worldwide.1 This homogeneity in output, coupled with variations 
5
Within- ﬁ  rm Labor Productivity 
across Countries
A Case Study
Francine Lafontaine and Jagadeesh Sivadasan
Francine Lafontaine is a professor of business economics and public policy at the Ross 
School of Business, University of Michigan. Jagadeesh Sivadasan is an assistant profes-
sor of business economics and public policy at the Ross School of Business, University of 
 Michigan.
Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, e-  mail: laf@umich.edu, 
 jagadees@umich.edu. We are grateful to the Sloan Foundation and the NBER for their gener-
ous support, and to Company oﬃcials—who shall remain nameless—for allowing us to learn 
about their organization, and providing us with the data to carry out this research. We also 
thank Kathryn Shaw, Richard Freeman, Amil Petrin, Jan Svejnar, and participants at seminars 
at the University of Michigan, International IO Conference (Northeastern University), and 
Stanford University for their comments, David Leibsohn, Eun-  Hee Kim, and Jon Plichta 
for their help with the data, and Robert Picard for his assistance. All remaining errors are 
our own.
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in outlet characteristics and in regulatory environment across countries, 
provide a unique opportunity to investigate how business practices, outlet 
characteristics, and regulatory contexts aﬀect productivity. Moreover, the 
fast- food industry is a fairly labor intensive, low margin industry, making it 
a setting where labor productivity is particularly important.
In this study, and in contrast to other contributions to this volume where 
authors emphasize the eﬀect of changes in business practices over time within 
a ﬁ  rm, we use weekly data from outlets of an international retail food chain 
to analyze how labor productivity—deﬁ  ned as the number of items pro-
duced per worker-  hour—varies across countries. Speciﬁ  cally, we consider 
how various outlet characteristics, such as outlet age, the experience level of 
workers, and the average order size, as well as the form of governance (which 
varies across outlets) aﬀect productivity. In addition, given the important 
role of labor costs in determining proﬁ  tability in this industry, we analyze 
how labor regulations related to hiring and ﬁ  ring—that is, those rules that 
aﬀect the capacity of the outlet manager to schedule workers ﬂ  exibly and 
add or subtract hours on the schedule, aﬀect observed average labor produc-
tivity and outlet- level output. To maintain conﬁ  dentiality restrictions on the 
data, throughout the chapter we refer to the multinational ﬁ  rm under study 
as “the Company” and the product sold in the retail outlets as “item(s).” 
Also for conﬁ  dentiality reasons, we are unable to provide certain details on 
the operations of the Company. However, we rely heavily on our understand-
ing of the industry and the ﬁ  rm, based on interviews with industry insiders, 
and on the trade press, in our modeling and interpretation of results.
To motivate our empirical analyses, we examine the optimization problem 
of individual outlets assuming a simple multi- input Cobb- Douglas produc-
tion function. Outlet-  level proﬁ  t maximization leads to a linear speciﬁ  ca-
tion for labor productivity, which should be increasing in labor wages and 
declining in output price.2 If outlets have some local market power, then 
average labor productivity would also depend on the elasticity of demand, 
with those facing less elastic demand curves cutting back on production and 
thus exhibiting higher productivity levels on average.
In addition to considering the eﬀect of input and output prices, we model 
how other factors can aﬀect observed labor productivity through their inﬂ  u-
within the constraints imposed by their production processes and facilities, using basically the 
same technologies.
2. Note that the equilibrium labor productivity is independent of the Hicks-  neutral total 
factor productivity (TFP) term in the Cobb-  Douglas production function. Speciﬁ  cally, ceteris 
paribus, outlets with higher levels of TFP would be larger than those with lower levels of TFP, 
but would move further down the marginal product curve so that the revenue marginal product 
of labor equals the prevailing wage rate. Under this condition, the Cobb- Douglas speciﬁ  cation 
yields the same average labor productivity for high and low TFP outlets facing the same wages 
and output prices. This is because the marginal product of labor is a constant times the average 
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ence on what we refer to as overhead labor.3 In other words, given what we 
know about what is expected of workers, we take for granted that some of 
the labor costs we observe for each outlet is dedicated to generating com-
plementary services, which, per the ﬁ  rm’s measurement process, we refer 
to as execution quality. Other aspects of quality, which the ﬁ  rm refers to 
under the heading of “compliance,” do not require additional labor hours. 
Incorporating this fact into our analyses, we ﬁ  nd that (a) execution qual-
ity has a negative eﬀect on our measure of labor productivity, as expected, 
but compliance has no such eﬀect; (b) outlet age beyond the ﬁ  rst year of 
operation and increases in the number of experienced employees do not have 
a statistically signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on labor productivity; and (c) larger order 
sizes on average improve labor productivity. The eﬀect of governance form 
is ambiguous, and the choice of governance form appears to be correlated 
with unobserved country ﬁ  xed eﬀects.
Next, we consider the eﬀect of diﬀerent labor regulations across countries 
on observed labor productivity. We expect labor market rigidities to increase 
the eﬀective cost of employing workers above the prevailing wage rate. We 
ﬁ  nd that indeed labor regulations that reduce ﬂ  exibility in hiring and ﬁ  ring 
workers raise the equilibrium labor productivity levels, consistent with our 
expectation that the laws raise the eﬀective cost of labor. Accordingly, we 
ﬁ  nd that increases in the rigidity of labor regulations lowers labor demand 
conditional on input and output prices. Our estimates imply that increas-
ing the index of labor regulations from the twenty-  ﬁ  fth to its seventy-  ﬁ  fth 
percentile level reduces conditional labor demand by about 12.4 percent.
Finally, we use the high frequency of our data to develop an empirical 
strategy that allows us to estimate the net impact of the labor law rigidity on 
output at the outlet level. Assuming optimizing behavior by outlets, three 
major factors inﬂ  uence the eﬀect of labor regulations on output: the eﬀect 
of regulations on the eﬀective wage locally, the elasticity of output with 
respect to inputs (in the production function), and the own-  price elasticity 
of demand. Using our most conservative approach to estimating demand 
elasticities, and a range of coeﬃcient estimates for the other factors, we con-
clude that an increase in labor regulation from the p25 level (   0.28) to p75 
level (   0.59) leads to a net reduction in outlet- level output (conditional on 
outlet level wages, output prices, capital, and demand shifters) of about 1.5 
percent to 2.6 percent. These results are consistent with the negative eﬀect of 
job security laws on employment found by Lazear (1990). Our conservative 
3. The standard approach in productivity studies is to examine total factor productivity 
(TFP) using a production function speciﬁ  cation. Here, we lack data on store level capital and 
hence would be unable to disentangle TFP from unobserved capital. Data constraints thus 
lead us to focus on labor productivity, as data on both output and labor input are available. 
However, as discussed previously, TFP does not aﬀect observed average labor productivity. 
Hence we capture the inﬂ  uence of factors such as product quality and governance through their 
potential eﬀect on overhead labor.140    Francine Lafontaine and Jagadeesh Sivadasan
estimates also are close to the 2 percent eﬀect on consumption calibrated 
by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) for a job security tax equivalent to one 
year’s wages for the United States.4
In the next section, we present a simple model that captures how key fac-
tors aﬀect measured labor productivity, labor demand, and output. In sec-
tion 5.3 we discuss the data and provide some details about the operations 
of the Company. We present results in section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2      Model and Empirical Speciﬁ  cations
In this section, we present a simple model of production and demand 
for a typical retail food outlet that allows us to analyze the eﬀects of outlet 
characteristics such as experience, execution quality, compliance, and gov-
ernance, as well as country- level labor regulations on outlet- level decisions. 
As we describe further below, we treat such characteristics as exogenous or 
predetermined at the time managers make input and output decisions given 
that our data are weekly. More generally, we use our theoretical framework 
to derive empirical speciﬁ  cations for labor productivity, labor demand, 
and output that highlight some industry facts and practices, per Company 
oﬃcials, and take into account the strengths and weaknesses of our data.
5.2.1    Basic  Speciﬁ  cation
We assume that food items (output) are produced in each outlet each 
period according to a simple three-  input Cobb-  Douglas production func-
tion, with materials M, capital K and labor L as the three inputs.
(1)  Q    L K M ,
where we assume that  ,  , and   are all greater than 0, and         1.5 
For simplicity, we omit outlet and time subscripts, keeping those implicit 
throughout our discussion of the model.
Initially, we take the output market as competitive; that is, we assume a 
horizontal demand curve. This assumption is not unreasonable in our con-
text since there are many close substitutes for the output of any fast-  food 
outlet, from outlets of other chains and from more local restaurant and food 
oﬀerings. Still, we relax this assumption further below. For now, however, 
under this assumption, outlet-  level proﬁ  ts are given by:
(2)      P   Q   wL   rK   sM.
4. Our research is related also to Card and Krueger (1997), as some of the studies in that 
book were concerned with the eﬀect of changes in minimum wage laws on employment levels 
in fast-  food chains. While they found no eﬀect of such changes on employment, other stud-
ies (e.g., Deere, Murphy, and Welch 1995) have found negative eﬀects of minimum wages on 
employment.
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We assume that for each outlet, capital is semi-  ﬁ  xed. That is, when the 
outlet manager makes weekly decisions, she is not free to choose capital—
the size of the store or the amount of equipment is taken as given—but she 
can vary labor and materials. In fact, from our discussions with industry 
insiders, one of the most important jobs of a store manager (or franchisee) 
in the fast-  food industry is to keep labor and materials costs low. In par-
ticular, they use data from the same week last year, and information about 
how the last few weeks this year compared to their experience the previous 
year, along with any information they have about the timing of special events 
in their market to forecast demand at their outlet one or two weeks ahead. 
They then plan their labor and materials purchases for the next one or two 
weeks based on these forecasts.6
Since each outlet is a small business, and thus a small employer and buyer 
locally, we assume material and labor are supplied at constant price through 
competitive input markets. At the optimum, the ﬁ  rst-  order condition for 
labor and material choices are binding so that the marginal cost of labor 
(material) is equal to the marginal revenue product of labor (material).
(3)  P(  L  1K M )   w
(4)  P(  L K M  1)   s.
Substituting for output and rearranging terms, equation (3) yields the fol-




L   log(w)   log(P)   log( )   e,
where e is a residual from measurement or represents optimization errors.7
Equation (5) implies that in a cross-  country context such as ours, if one 
assumes that the technology used within each outlet is the same everywhere 
for this type of chain (or more precisely that the parameter   is the same 
6. See, for example, Deery and Mahony (1994) on the importance of labor ﬂ  exibility in retail 
generally, and Hueter and Swart (1998) for information on how Taco Bell uses operations 
research models to optimize its labor usage and minimize its labor costs. The authors estimate 
that the company saved $40M in labor costs between 1993 and 1996 through the labor manage-
ment system it developed at the time.
7. In this speciﬁ  cation, deviations from unit values in estimated parameters for wage and 
output price could be due to measurement error in prices and wages, or to a mis-  speciﬁ  cation 
of the production function. For example, it can be shown that the general Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) production function yields the same speciﬁ  cation as we use here, except that 
the coeﬃcient on price and wage would be the coeﬃcient of substitution. That is, if we assume 
Q   ( L     K     M )1/ , then the speciﬁ  cation in equation (5) is modiﬁ  ed to log(Q/L)     
log(w) –    log(P) –    log( )   e, where     (  –  1)/ . We maintain the Cobb- Douglas assumption 
in part because it ﬁ  ts the data reasonably well, as will be clear following, and because it allows 
us to evaluate the eﬀect of labor regulations on output per the method outlined in section 5.2.4. 
The Cobb-  Douglas functional form is not an unusual assumption in the literature examining 
ﬁ  rm performance (see, e.g., Olley and Pakes [1996], and Fabrizio, Rose, and Wolfram [2007]).142    Francine Lafontaine and Jagadeesh Sivadasan
across countries), labor productivity would be higher in countries where 
the wage rate w is high and/  or the price per item P is low. In other words, 
we should observe higher labor productivity where the cost of labor is high 
relative to the price of output.
As noted previously, each outlet in our data is a very small ﬁ  rm, and the 
Company itself is just one of many diﬀerent companies oﬀering diﬀerent 
food options to customers, as was made clear in our discussions with Com-
pany managers. In some applications, an identiﬁ  cation issue for equation 
(5) can arise from the endogeneity of wages. In our context, however, we 
view the assumption that each outlet faces a horizontal labor supply curve 
in its local labor market as highly plausible, given the size of these outlets 
relative to the total retail marketplace. Further, we focus our attention on 
wage diﬀerences across countries, which are even less likely to be aﬀected 
by the amount of labor employed by individual outlets (or even by the total 
employment of the Company in any one country).8
5.2.2      Overhead Labor and Outlet Characteristics
Fast-  food production, while relatively straightforward, nonetheless 
requires some coordination as well as the provision of various complemen-
tary services, such as clean areas to consume the food, clean restrooms, well-
 stocked condiment bars, and so on. The production of these complementary 
services also entails the use of labor. To allow for this, we modify the basic 
model above to add the assumption that part of observed labor represents 
overhead labor that does not directly contribute to producing output. This 
modeling approach draws on Aghion and Howitt (1994), and has been 
viewed as a fairly realistic representation of production processes in the 
context of the retail sector (see Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan 2002).
We assume that overhead labor is utilized in several diﬀerent ways in 
the Company’s outlets, and that this aﬀects how some outlet character-
istics should be factored into our production function framework. Let 
observed total labor at the outlet be L ˆ and the optimal labor level (net of 
overhead labor) be L. We assume that the number of overhead employees is 
a fraction   of the optimal labor level. Then, the speciﬁ  cation for observed 




L ˆ   log(w)   log(P)   log( )   log
L ˆ
 
L   e
  log(w)   log(P)   log( )  log(1    )   e.
8. One approach to instrumenting for wages could be to use the average wage for the region 
(similar to the approach in Hausman [1996]). But since we use the predicted wage based on 
average wage for cities reported by the Economist’s Intelligence Unit (EIU), our wage measure 
is already purged of any variation from outlet-  speciﬁ  c factors.Within- ﬁ  rm Labor Productivity across Countries: A Case Study    1 4 3
The impact of various outlet characteristics on measured outlet-  level 
average labor productivity thus depends on their eﬀect on the fraction of 
overhead labor  . Factors that increase the fraction of overhead labor would 
reduce average labor productivity, and vice versa. In what follows, we discuss 
the expected eﬀects of outlet-  level variables such as output quality, experi-
ence of employees, governance, and so on.
(i) Quality (Se, Sc): Outlets in a franchise chain all operate under a com-
mon brand whose value depends crucially on consistent operations and 
consistent, positive consumer experiences across outlets. As a result, outlets 
are required to maintain quality levels to the parent company’s standards, 
and franchisors spend both time and resources monitoring the operations 
of each outlet. At the Company, outlets are audited on a periodical basis, 
and various individual scores are summarized under two major headings: (a) 
Execution (Se), which measures how well the outlet meets product speciﬁ  ca-
tions (size, presentation, portion sizes), speed of customer service require-
ments, cleanliness of customer areas, and so on; and (b) Compliance (Sc), 
which captures the extent to which the outlet abides by policies concerning 
temperature and length of storage for food products, employee safety rules, 
employee grooming and attire, and so on.
Given what these scores represent, we view execution quality as a second 
output produced by workers at the outlet. Thus, we expect that increasing 
execution quality level would, all else equal, require more labor resources 
to be diverted from actual item production. For example, customer wait 
times might be improved by hiring extra staﬀ to take orders or work behind 
the counter. Similarly, better scores on store and customer area cleanli-
ness require more labor resources to be allocated to related tasks. Hence, 
we expect the fraction of what we call overhead labor   to increase with 











   0.
We expect compliance, on the other hand, to be less labor intensive—no 
labor is required to comply with grooming and dress code policies, for ex-
ample. In fact, for the latter, it is likely less time consuming to rely on the 
sources of inputs suggested or required by the Company than it would be for 
an outlet to ﬁ  nd its own sources. In that sense, we believe compliance does 
not really involve the use of extra labor. At the same time, it should contrib-
ute to the value of the franchise (i.e., it should increase demand via the value 
of the brand, as franchisors all argue compliance does). In that context, 
compliance with company policies could reduce wastage in the long run, 
including potential waste in the use of labor. This, then, could be reﬂ  ected 144    Francine Lafontaine and Jagadeesh Sivadasan
in lower (total) labor. Thus, we expect compliance potentially to contribute 
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(ii) Average order size ( ): We expect less labor (overhead and crew) to be 
required in outlets where the average order size is larger. For example, larger 
orders should be associated with larger production batches and reduced 
handling. As mentioned by company managers, larger orders are also par-
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(iii) Governance structure (G): The ownership structure of the Company’s 
outlets varies from country to country, and in many cases from outlet to 
outlet within a country. There are ﬁ  ve major types of governance struc-
tures (the last part of the chain indicates the owner of the outlet): (1) Par-
ent Company → Local Franchisee (about 4 percent of outlets in the data); 
(2) Parent Company → Master Franchisee (about 43 percent); (3) Parent 
Company → Master Franchisee → Local Franchisee (about 44 percent); 
(4) Parent Company → Area Developer (about 7 percent); and (5) Parent 
Company owns and operates the outlet (about 2 percent). Note that the 
vast majority of outlets operate under master franchise agreements, where 
a ﬁ  rm or individual pays a fee for the right to a territory (often a whole 
country). Within this territory, the master franchisee may operate outlets 
directly or sell outlets to franchisees who then operate them. Master Fran-
chisees most often do both, and act as a franchisor to the franchisees whom 
they recruit, sharing the franchise fees and royalties paid by their franchisees 
with the Company. Area developers are also granted the right to a territory 
(for a fee) but they are not allowed to sell franchises within this territory. 
Instead, an area developer necessarily owns and operates all the outlets in his 
territory.
Given the distribution of governance structures in our data, and the fact 
that within-  country variation in governance form in particular takes the 
form of franchisee-  owned versus nonfranchisee owned outlets, in what fol-
lows we focus on this distinction only.
The expected eﬀect of franchisee ownership on average labor productivity 
is somewhat ambiguous, however. In general, franchisees are expected to put 
forth a greater level of eﬀort in running their outlets (including monitoring 
crew labor), and hence one should ﬁ  nd greater eﬃciency in the use of over-Within- ﬁ  rm Labor Productivity across Countries: A Case Study    1 4 5
head and other labor for outlets owned and operated by franchisees.9 This, in 
turn, implies that we should ﬁ  nd higher levels of observed labor productivity 
for franchised outlets. Denoting franchisee-  owned outlets by the dummy 
Df ee, then, holding all other factors constant, we expect:




L ⏐Df ee   1   Elog
Q
 
L ⏐Df ee   0.
Two sets of factors may aﬀect this prediction, however. One relates to data 
and measurement issues, while the other has to do with how outlet gover-
nance itself is selected by the ﬁ  rm. In terms of data and measurement, as 
discussed later, we measure labor inputs as total labor costs at the outlet 
divided by a country-  level measure of wages. This approach to measuring 
labor usage, which is dictated by data constraints, may aﬀect our results in 
two ways. First, outlets owned by franchisees may have downward-  biased 
labor cost ﬁ  gures as these costs may exclude the compensation or full oppor-
tunity cost of franchisees’ time. Since the latter typically undertake activities 
performed by paid managers in other outlets, but may be compensated for 
their eﬀort at least partly through proﬁ  ts, the data on labor costs may under-
estimate total labor cost. Once divided by the wage rate, they would yield 
an underestimate of hours of labor used, and thus give rise to an upward 
biased measure of average labor productivity. Such a bias, of course, would 
reinforce our previous prediction that we should expect higher labor produc-
tivity in franchised outlets. The issue then is that if we ﬁ  nd such higher pro-
ductivity in franchised outlets, it will not be possible to determine whether 
this result arises from a real diﬀerence in productivity, per our hypothesis, 
or from a labor cost measurement problem.
Second, it could be that franchisees are better able to identify and hire 
workers at lower wage rates and substitute for lower labor quality through 
closer monitoring. In this case, the eﬀective wage paid to workers in 
franchisee-  owned outlets would be lower than for nonfranchised outlets. 
The net impact of this is ambiguous. As reﬂ  ected in equation (6), we would 
expect these outlets to have greater output on the margin, given the lower 
marginal cost of production, and thus lower average levels of labor produc-
tivity. However, if franchisee-  owned ﬁ  rms do indeed use relatively lower 
paid workers, our measured employment levels for franchisee- owned outlets 
would be biased downward given our reliance on country-  level wages to 
infer employment from labor costs, so that measured labor productivity for 
these could be upward biased.
The other problem with our predictions is that as stated, our hypothesis 
9. See Shelton (1967) and Krueger (1991) for some evidence that costs may be lower in 
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takes governance form as given. Yet while the eﬀect of franchisee ownership 
on overhead labor may be eﬃciency enhancing, one expects the presence of 
diﬀerent governance forms within and across countries to be an endogenous 
response to unmodeled incentive constraints, as well as regulatory and market 
conditions. Thus, in equilibrium, labor eﬃciency advantages of franchisee-
  owned outlets may be oﬀset by other costs to the parent company, and 
diﬀerent governance forms would be chosen in diﬀerent countries/  contexts 
depending on the relative beneﬁ  ts and costs of particular governance forms. 
Still, on this issue, it is important to recognize that governance forms are 
not changed frequently—franchise contracts typically last for ten to twenty 
years—and thus it is reasonable to treat them as ﬁ  xed by the time weekly 
decisions about labor and materials are made.
(iv) Experience (Eemp, Estore): It is typical in studies of labor productivity 
to consider how learning and employee experience levels aﬀect productivity. 
In our data, we have access to information about employee and outlet-  level 
experience. The ﬁ  rst, Eemp, is proxied by the number of workers with more 
than one year of experience at time t. The second type of measure, Estore, 
captures experience/  learning embodied in the outlet itself and is proxied 
by the age of the outlet. It is standard to assume that greater experience 
levels for the employees should help eliminate unnecessary overhead and 
improve eﬃciency. Similarly, learning at the outlet level should reduce over-
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Incorporating the above factors into equation (6) and adopting a linear 





L   log(w)   log(P)   log( )   aseSe   ascSc   a  log( ) 
  adfeeDf ee   aeeEemp   aesEstore   e.
As discussed, we expect:
ase   0, asc   0, a    0, adfee   0, aee   0, aes   0.
5.2.3      Imperfectly Competitive Output Markets
The restaurant and fast-  food industry are typically viewed as ones that 
ﬁ  t the assumptions of monopolistic competition quite well. Here, indeed, 
the Company’s outlets operate under a brand, and as such, the product 
10. Another variable capturing store/  country level experience is the number of years the 
company has been in the country, which we examine in some of our robustness regressions.Within- ﬁ  rm Labor Productivity across Countries: A Case Study    1 4 7
they sell is diﬀerentiated. Given this, our model should allow for imperfect 
competition in the output market, or a downward-  sloping demand at the 
outlet level. Thus, we now let outlet-  level demand be given by:
(8) P    A   Q1/   ,
where   is the elasticity of demand, which must be greater than one in 
absolute value.11 With this demand curve, the ﬁ  rst- order conditions in equa-
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1
 
    log( )   e.
Our data (see section 5.3) include measures for all the variables in equation 
(9) except for demand elasticity. One way to control for this unobserved 
parameter in our productivity regressions would be to include location- time 
ﬁ  xed eﬀects that implicitly control for potential demand shifters. However, 
the inclusion of such ﬁ  xed eﬀects would limit our ability to study the eﬀect 
of labor regulation, which is ﬁ  xed at the country level, and other factors of 
interest such as quality, which is ﬁ  xed for store- quarters; governance, which 
is ﬁ  xed at the store level; and experience, which would have little meaningful 
variation within a store-  quarter. An alternative approach, which we adopt, 
is to control for demand elasticity using data on materials choices. Rearrang-
ing the modiﬁ  ed ﬁ  rst-  order condition for materials gives:
(10)  1   
1
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    aseSe 
  ascSc   a log( )   adfeeDf ee   aeeEemp   aesEstore   e.
11. This condition must be satisﬁ  ed in equilibrium for outlet proﬁ  t maximization and for 
second- order conditions to yield interior solutions. Also, in the general case   could depend on 
the level of price, so that elasticity would not be constant along the demand curve. We assume 
that demand is iso- elastic to make our model empirically tractable. Given that outlet level prices 
move within a narrow band, we do not believe that this assumption is very restrictive. In our 
empirical speciﬁ  cations for demand, moreover, we control for local and seasonal factors that 
could aﬀect the elasticity of demand.148    Francine Lafontaine and Jagadeesh Sivadasan
Estimating equation (12) with our cross-  country data implicitly assumes 
that the production function parameters   and   are either constant across 
countries, or are uncorrelated with other regressors. As noted earlier, given 
the nature of the business, which is replicated from one location to another 
with a strong desire for consistency and conformity by the Company, the 
notion that the diﬀerent outlets function under similar technology, pro-
cesses, and standards is consistent with Company policy and with various 
statements made by Company managers.
5.2.4      Impact of Labor Regulations
In addition to studying the eﬀect of outlet characteristics (as described 
above) on measured labor productivity, another goal of this study is to 
examine the eﬀect of laws that increase labor market rigidity on measured 
labor productivity, labor demand, and output. We emphasize the poten-
tial eﬀect of labor regulation for the Company because labor costs are a 
large part of total costs at fast-  food outlets, and, given the very low mar-
gins in this industry, ﬁ  rms—including the Company—expand signiﬁ  cant 
eﬀort on labor cost minimization. At Taco Bell, for example, labor costs 
were estimated to be about 30 percent of every dollar of sales at the time 
Hueter and Swart (1998) examined labor scheduling at this company. 
They were also described as among the “largest controllable costs” at 
that company. Moreover, despite chain eﬀorts, business practices in labor 
management can vary tremendously across outlets, leading to important 
diﬀerences in costs and labor turnover rates.12 Under these circumstances, 
regulations further aﬀecting labor ﬂ  exibility could have a large impact 
on both labor practices and costs. Our goal is to assess and quantify the 
latter eﬀect.
We measure labor market rigidity using an index developed in Botero et al. 
(2004) (see appendix), which combines measures of the diﬃculty or cost of 
using part- time employment, increasing hours worked, and hiring and ﬁ  ring 
workers. Note that, in theory, the eﬀect of labor laws could be oﬀset by indi-
vidual outlets through contracts and agreements on side payments with their 
workers (Lazear 1990). In the absence of oﬀsetting agreements—whether 
this is because of bargaining ineﬃciencies or incomplete contracts—these 
laws could aﬀect labor demand at the outlet level, and, consequently, mea-
sured labor productivity.
A rich literature in labor economics has examined both theoretically and 
empirically the link between labor market regulations and employment 
(see Heckman and Pagés [2003] for a review). Both the theoretical and 
empirical work is divided on the net impact of labor rigidities on employ-
ment. It is easy to see how ﬁ  ring costs, for example, may increase as well 
12. See Berta (2007) reporting on research conducted by Prof. Jerry Newman.Within- ﬁ  rm Labor Productivity across Countries: A Case Study    1 4 9
as decrease employment. On the one hand, increased ﬁ  ring costs would 
provide an immediate incentive not to ﬁ  re workers when there is a nega-
tive demand (or productivity) shock. On the other hand, ﬁ  rms anticipate 
future ﬁ  ring costs and therefore hire less workers than required when times 
are good (positive demand/  productivity shocks). The overall eﬀect on 
employment in a cross-  section of ﬁ  rms depends on which of these eﬀects 
predominates.
For our purposes, motivated by Lazear’s (1990) ﬁ  ndings of a negative 
employment eﬀect of labor rigidities, we model the rigid labor laws as 
increasing the eﬀective marginal cost (or the shadow cost) of labor as per-
ceived by an individual outlet.13 Thus, we have:
weﬀ   wobs   exp( Reg),
where we expect     0. Since higher wages leading to lower labor levels 
increase the equilibrium marginal product of labor, greater rigidity in labor 
markets would lead to higher average equilibrium labor productivity. Thus, 
expanding the speciﬁ  cation for labor productivity in equation (12) to include 
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While the eﬀect of labor regulation is expected to increase the equilibrium 
average labor productivity, the rigidity in the labor markets caused by the 
regulation has detrimental eﬀects that are best shown in the labor demand 
equation (conditional on output and prices). To see this, we rearrange equa-
tion (13) above to yield:
(14) log  L   log Q   log(wobs)   log(P)   log(msh)   log
 
 
    aseSe 
    ascSc  a  log( )   adfeeDf ee   aeeEemp   aesEstore 
   Reg   e.
The ultimate eﬀect of the regulation, however, is to decrease output at the 
outlet level. This can be seen by solving for output:
13. Given the nature of these laws, a careful examination of their impact would require anal-
ysis and calibration of a dynamic labor choice model (as in, e.g., Hopenhayn and Rogerson 
[1993]). Unfortunately, data limitations, especially with regard to outlet-  level capital stock, 
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where       [1   (1  )], and       [1  (1  )].
The eﬀect of labor regulation on output thus depends on four parameters: 
 ,  ,  , and  . In particular, the negative eﬀect of labor regulation on output 
becomes larger the larger   and   are. In other words, the greater the elasticity 
of output with respect to the two variable factors, the greater is the distortion 
in output due to regulation. Also, the negative impact of the regulations is 
greater the larger the (absolute value of the) own- price elasticity of demand. 
This is because when demand is less elastic, the outlet can pass the increased 
labor costs on to the consumer without having to reduce its output level as 
much. Thus, the eﬀect of the regulation on output will be felt the most in 
those cases where the own-  price elasticity of demand is very high; that is, 
when output markets are very competitive, on account of the availability of 
close substitutes, or because of the preferences of the consumers.14
Given our goal of estimating the impact of the regulations on output, one 
approach would be to directly estimate equation (15). This is unfortunately 
not possible with our data since we do not observe store-  level capital (K), 
nor store-  speciﬁ  c materials price(s), nor store-  level demand shifters (A). 
One plausible way to condition out these unobserved variables would be 
to include store-  period ﬁ  xed eﬀects in our regressions, but then we would 
be unable to identify the coeﬃcients on many of our variables of interest, 
including the index of labor regulation given that this index is the same for 
all outlets in a country and constant over the two years of data we have.
Given that the direct estimation of equation (15) is infeasible, we estimate 
the four parameters determining the net impact of labor regulations on 
output as follows:
(i) Parameter   is recovered as the coeﬃcient of the regulation index in 
14. In general, Marshall’s (1920) four laws summarizing the determinants of own-  price 
elasticity of factor demand apply: (a) Substitutability of other factors for labor. This does 
not explicitly appear in our model because the Cobb-  Douglas production function we use 
is a special case where the elasticity of substitution between factors is one; (b) Elasticity of 
demand for the ﬁ  nal good. This eﬀect shows up in our previous derivations; (c) The share of 
labor in total costs. This eﬀect shows up in the denominator; that is, via (1 –     –    ); (d) Supply 
elasticity of other factors. Here we assume that the other variable factor (materials) is supplied 
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the labor demand speciﬁ  cation described by equation (14) or the speciﬁ  ca-
tion for labor productivity in equation (13).15
(ii) We recover the technology parameters   and   by estimating the origi-
nal Cobb-  Douglas production function directly, namely:
(16) log(Q)    log( )     log(L)     log(K)    log(M)   ε.
Here again, the challenge is that capital K is not observed. Also, we only 
observe the total cost of materials, or sM, not the quantity of such inputs 
directly. However, in this case we do not have any variable of interest that 
does not change by country or across time periods. We can therefore address 
these data issues by making use of the high frequency of our data and assum-
ing that: (a) capital does not vary for any given store within a season or 
month, so that capital gets absorbed by store-  year-  season or store-  year-
 month  ﬁ  xed eﬀects; and (b) similarly, materials prices do not change for 
any given store within a season or month, so that variations in such costs 
after including store-  year-  season or store-  year-  month ﬁ  xed eﬀects reﬂ  ect 
changes in material quantities only.
With these assumptions, we obtain   as the coeﬃcient on materials costs, 
and   as the coeﬃcient on labor costs, in the production function speciﬁ  ca-
tion in equation (16), after including store- year- season or store- year- month 
ﬁ  xed eﬀects.
(iii) Finally, for the elasticity of demand parameter, we estimate a simple 
iso-  elastic demand function:
(17) log(Q)      log(A)     log(P)    .
The identiﬁ  cation issue here involves potential omitted variables, in particu-
lar unobserved demand shifters that might aﬀect A. We address this issue in 
many ways. First, we eliminate store eﬀects via ﬁ  rst diﬀerences. Moreover, we 
rely again on the high frequency of our data, and include store- year- month 
or  store- year- season  ﬁ  xed eﬀects. In a ﬁ  rst-  diﬀerence equation, these will 
capture store-  speciﬁ  c trends within months or seasons.16 Alternatively, as 
detailed further below, we use (ﬁ  rst-  diﬀerenced) materials costs per unit of 
output, and average output price in all other stores in the country in the same 
month, as instruments for price in equation (17).17
15. As noted earlier, we believe it is reasonable to treat wages as exogenous in our context. 
Moreover, we maintain the assumption that the technology parameters are either constant 
across countries, or uncorrelated with the other variables of interest, most importantly the 
labor regulation index.
16. We have veriﬁ  ed that our results are very similar when we do not use ﬁ  rst diﬀerences, 
and/  or when we include fewer ﬁ  xed eﬀects. However, we chose to present results where we use 
all these controls for unobserved eﬀects given that our data allow us to do so.
17. Our average output price instrument is similar to the average price instrument used by 
Hausman (1996) and hence is vulnerable to Bresnahan’s (1996) critique. The key element of the 
critique is that there is a reason why the price at one outlet may be correlated with the prices at 
other outlets, which is the basis on which these prices could serve as an instrument for price at 
outlet i. So suppose that each outlet chooses price—the presumption we are making when we 152    Francine Lafontaine and Jagadeesh Sivadasan
5.3      Data Description and Deﬁ  nition of Variables
The main source of data for this study is an internal data set from an inter-
national retail fast-  food chain. We have weekly outlet-  level ﬁ  nancial data 
on inputs and output levels for every outlet in every foreign country for the 
years 2002 and 2003. In addition, we have information on both ownership 
and quality of operations (execution and compliance) from audits that the 
Company performs for each outlet on average once every three months.18
In our analyses, we want to ensure that we compare outcomes obtained 
under similar circumstances. For that reason, starting with all outlets, we 
eliminated all observations that pertained to potentially unusual situations, 
such as outlets operating with a diﬀerent type of facility (e.g., limited menu 
facilities), or observations related to unusual time periods (i.e., at start-  up 
or within a short time from the closing of an outlet). Speciﬁ  cally, we exclude 
observations that are within the ﬁ  rst year of operation for an outlet, and 
those observations pertaining to the last year of an outlet’s operations. We 
also removed outlets that changed ownership the year before or after our 
period of analysis, as such changes are often accompanied by various disrup-
tions, including renovations and temporary outlet closure. Additionally, a 
number of outlets and countries do not have information on all the variables 
we rely on. We exclude these as well.
Summary statistics for key variables in our study are presented in table 
5.1. In what follows, we deﬁ  ne each of the variables and explain how it is 
measured. To analyze labor productivity, we require a measure of output 
and labor input at the outlet level. The data already include a measure of the 
number of items produced by each outlet every week. Of course, in reality, 
the outlets oﬀer a menu of diﬀerent products to their customers. The com-
pany, however, translates this into a single metric, which it refers to internally 
as “items.” We therefore follow the company’s internal processes and use 
“number of items” as our measure of outlet-  level output each week. As for 
labor input, our data include information on total labor cost (w   L) for each 
outlet. To transform this into a measure of labor input, we need a measure 
of average hourly wages paid by each outlet to their workers. Since we do 
not have access to outlet-  level data on wages, we use labor cost per hour 
data for 2002 and 2003 from the CityData data set, which is maintained by 
allow downward sloping demand curves that are acted upon in the model—but the Company 
sets national advertising level, which is not observed. This advertising level then will aﬀect 
all local demands similarly, explaining why they move together. The prices at other outlets, 
however, will not be a good instrument for the price at outlet i under these circumstances, as 
the same omitted variable—unobserved advertising—aﬀects both. Since material costs are 
more likely to be driven by shifts in input supply or by diﬀerences in output composition, our 
material costs instrument is less vulnerable to the Bresnahan critique.
18. The average number of days between two audits is 101 days; however, there is signiﬁ  cant 
variation in this ﬁ  gure, probably because the parent ﬁ  rm keeps its audit process somewhat 
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the Economist Intelligence Unit. This source contains country-  level wage, 
and hence allows us to calculate employment for twenty-  seven diﬀerent 
countries in our sample.19
We obtain output price, P, by dividing the data on total sales value by 
the reported number of items sold.20 The material cost per item(s) also is 
obtained by dividing total material costs by the number of items sold.21 The 
material share of revenue is obtained by dividing material costs by sales rev-
enue. To minimize the eﬀect of outliers, we winsorize the log material share 
of revenue by 1 percent on the tails of the distribution.
The parent company performs audits of outlets and compiles scores on 
various measures of operational performance that can be interpreted as 
Table 5.1   Summary statistics
Variable   N   Mean   SD   Median   Min   Max
Log(Quantity   Number of items sold per 
week)
225,487 6.764 0.744 6.724 0.693 10.238
Log(Labor hours: Uses wages imputed using 
EIU data)
154,526 5.188 0.719 5.129 –6.141 9.351
Log(Material cost in USD) 233,861 7.790 0.683 7.882 –4.174 13.177
Log(Items per hour: Uses wages imputed using 
EIU data)
140,070 1.577 0.968 1.402 –3.823 12.109
Log(Price   Sales/item in USD) 225,421 2.106 0.548 2.185 –1.472 8.349
Log(Wage: Imputed for whole country using 
EIU city data)
197,522 1.929 1.183 2.729 –0.598 3.401
Log(Material cost/sales)a 233,794 –1.114 0.205 –1.082 –1.628 –0.626
Total execution points/100: Interpolated 82,681 0.494 0.127 0.520 0.000 0.700
Total compliance points/100: Interpolated 82,681 0.226 0.042 0.232 0.000 0.300
Outlet age in days/10,000 190,738 0.243 0.159 0.210 –0.025 0.754
Number of experienced employees (1plus)/100: 
Interpolateda
82,681 0.050 0.049 0.040 0.000 0.210
Experience (years) in country 235,378 13.979 4.052 14.000 2.000 20.000
Log(Average order size   Number of items/
transaction)
211,514 0.356 0.336 0.311 –5.358 5.201
Dummy (Franchisee-  owned   1) 82,681 0.496 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
Index of labor regulations (Botero et al 2004) 219,223 0.421 0.159 0.443 0.161 0.828
Log(Exchange rate)   242,031   2.350   2.650   2.200   –1.240   14.360
Note: SD   standard deviation.
aThese variables are winsorized by 1 percent on the upper and lower limit of the distribution to minimize 
inﬂ  uence of outliers.
19. As mentioned below, we checked the robustness of our results to our measure of wages 
using two alternative sources of labor cost data. Results were generally consistent with those 
reported below. See next section.
20. Since the product mix varies from outlet to outlet and from week to week, our output price 
measure captures diﬀerences in price levels but also some amount of variation in output mix.
21. Note that while the theory suggests using marginal wages and prices, data limitations lead 
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quality measures. As mentioned earlier, these measures are translated into 
total scores on two dimensions: (a) Execution (which includes measures of 
item quality, speed of execution of orders, and cleanliness of outlet), and (b) 
Compliance (which includes compliance with product storage and handling 
requirements, grooming and uniforms, and employee security policies). We 
use the separate scores on execution and compliance as our measures of 
quality (Se and Sc). As these audits are performed only every several months 
(while our other data are weekly), we assign the same score to the outlet as 
long as a new audit is not performed, and refer to the resulting variables 
as interpolated. Some audit data are available for about 68.3 percent of 
the outlets (1,842 out of 2,695). However, all outlets were not audited with 
high frequency, so that even after interpolation, audit data is available for 
only 34 percent of the observations (i.e., 82,681 out of 242,031 outlet-  week 
observations).
Average Order Size,  , is deﬁ  ned as the number of items sold in the week 
divided by the total number of transactions. As for governance, as discussed 
earlier, we deﬁ  ne a dummy variable (“d_franchisee”) denoting outlets that 
are owned and operated by a local franchisee as opposed to being owned and 
operated directly by the Company, an area developer, or a master franchisee. 
As this variable is available through audit reports, it is deﬁ  ned only for the 
set of observations for which we also have quality data.
Our data include several measures of experience. Three variables cap-
ture the experience of the labor force: (a) tenure of manager at the outlet, 
(b) tenure of manager as an employee of the chain, and (c) the number of 
employees with greater than one year of tenure at the outlet. The data also 
include information on the opening date for every outlet. Thus, we have 
data on (d) the age of each outlet, as well as (e) years of experience of the 
Company in the country (inferred from the earliest opening data among out-
lets within a country). Unfortunately, we found large coding errors for the 
manager tenure variables. Consequently, in our analyses we focus on a single 
measure of employee experience, namely the number of employees with 
greater than one year of experience. We also rely on data on the age of the 
outlet as our measure outlet-  level experience, as these data are richer than 
information on the number of years since the Company began operations 
in each country. To minimize the inﬂ  uence of outliers, we again winsorize 
the employee experience variable (number of experienced employees) by 1 
percent on the tails of its distribution.
Finally, as discussed in section 5.2.4, we measure the intensity of labor 
regulation using an index constructed by Botero et al. (2004). The deﬁ  ni-
tions of the diﬀerent components of this index are detailed in the appendix. 
Unfortunately, while the Company had operations in about ﬁ  fty-  nine coun-
tries around the world during the period of our study (2002 to 2003), audit 
data is available for only forty-  ﬁ  ve countries. Of these forty-  ﬁ  ve countries, 
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on wages is available for twenty-  seven. Thus, data limitations restrict the 
sample used in most of our analysis to twenty-  seven or less countries.22
5.4    Empirical  Results
In this section, we ﬁ  rst examine the eﬀects of quality, average order size, 
experience, and the choice of organizational or governance form, on labor 
productivity. We then discuss our results concerning the eﬀects of labor regu-
lations on labor productivity. Finally, we estimate the eﬀect of labor regulation 
on output, following the procedure outlined in section 5.2.4.
5.4.1    Eﬀect of Quality, Average Order Size, Governance, and Experience
We show the eﬀects of various outlet characteristics on observed labor 
productivity in table 5.2. We include various subsets of our variables of 
interest in the diﬀerent columns in part because our sample sizes are much 
reduced in some cases, so we want to show that our results are robust across 
speciﬁ  cations. Moreover, in the ﬁ  rst seven columns our regressions include 
country- month  ﬁ  xed eﬀects to control for country-  speciﬁ  c characteristics 
along with potential seasonal eﬀects.23 In columns (8) and (9), we control 
for region-  season ﬁ  xed eﬀects to provide comparisons to the speciﬁ  cations 
in tables 5.3 and 5.4.24
In all the speciﬁ  cations, we ﬁ  nd a signiﬁ  cant positive eﬀect for wages and 
negative eﬀect of output prices, as predicted by theory. In fact, our simple 
model implies a coeﬃcient of 1 and –  1 on wage and price, respectively. The 
coeﬃcients for these variables in table 5.2 are remarkably close to unity, sug-
gesting that the Cobb- Douglas speciﬁ  cation provides a reasonable approxi-
mation in our context.25
The materials cost to sales ratio introduced to capture imperfect output 
22. As requested by one of the referees, for the key dependent variables in our analysis, we 
undertook a test for stationarity using the methodology proposed by Im, Pesaran, and Shin 
(2003), which rejected the null of nonstationarity for all the variables. These results are in an 
appendix available on request from the authors. The Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) test allows 
for heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and nonnormality. Because the period ﬁ  xed eﬀects we 
use vary across speciﬁ  cations, we tested with and without allowing for such eﬀects. The null was 
rejected in all cases at p values less than 1 percent.
23. A regression of labor productivity on country ﬁ  xed eﬀects by itself shows that across-
 country  diﬀerences account for about 83 percent of the variation, and country-  month eﬀects 
about 85 percent. Thus, the R-  squareds in table 5.2 should be interpreted accordingly. Note 
that in these regressions, the wage eﬀect is identiﬁ  ed oﬀ of variation in wages across the two 
years in our data, as our ﬁ  xed eﬀects are deﬁ  ned as country-  month or country-  season, not 
country-  year-  month or country-  year-  season. If we use the latter, we get similar results for 
other variables, but in this case the wage coeﬃcient is not identiﬁ  ed in the ﬁ  rst seven columns.
24. The variables of interest here—quality, order size, governance, and experience—vary at 
the outlet level, so we are able to include country-  month ﬁ  xed eﬀects. In the next section, we 
will be examining labor regulations, which are constant within country; in those regressions we 
can include only region-  season ﬁ  xed eﬀects.
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markets (see section 5.2.3) is only marginally signiﬁ  cant, and becomes insig-
niﬁ  cant in particular in regressions where we control only for region- season 
eﬀects. If we interpreted this to mean the coeﬃcient is indeed zero, it would 
suggest that our more basic model, based on the notion that the market is 
perfectly competitive, may be appropriate for these data.
As for outlet characteristics, we ﬁ  nd some evidence that higher execution 
quality scores are associated with lower labor productivity, which is con-
sistent with our expectation that improving execution quality may require 
extra overhead labor (columns [2], [6], and [7]). Using the coeﬃcients from 
column (7), which is our most complete speciﬁ  cation for labor productiv-
ity, a one standard deviation (0.13) increase in execution points decreases 
log labor productivity by about 2.7 percent (–  0.21 × 0.13). Compliance, on 
the other hand, does not seem to have any statistically signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on 
labor productivity.
We also ﬁ  nd no statistically signiﬁ  cant eﬀect of either of our measures of 
experience on labor productivity in any of the regressions. Note that here, we 
focus on steady- state eﬀects as we have excluded from the data those outlets 
that had not been operating for at least one year. The lack of signiﬁ  cance of 
outlet age suggests that there is not much overhead-  saving learning within 
outlets over time, at least beyond the ﬁ  rst year of operation for these types 
of retail outlets. Our results do not inform us on, nor preclude the existence 
of, signiﬁ  cant eﬃciency improvements in the ﬁ  rst few weeks or months after 
an outlet is established.
We ﬁ nd that order size is positively correlated with labor productivity, in 
line with our expectation that less overhead labor is required to produce a 
given quantity of items when the average order size is larger. The eﬀect here is 
statistically and economically signiﬁ  cant; a one standard deviation increase 
in the log order size (0.34) increases labor productivity by about 9.9 percent 
(using the coeﬃcient estimate of 0.29 from column [7] again).
Finally, the coeﬃcient on the dummy variable for franchisee-  ownership 
of an outlet is not statistically signiﬁ  cant in the speciﬁ  cations that include 
country ﬁ  xed eﬀects. In columns (8) and (9), where we include only region 
(North and South) and season (winter, spring, summer, and fall) ﬁ  xed eﬀects, 
we ﬁ  nd a positive and signiﬁ  cant eﬀect for franchisee ownership. While the 
latter result is consistent with the idea that there are better incentives for 
controlling overhead labor in franchisee owned outlets, we are cautious 
about this interpretation given that the eﬀect disappears when we control 
for country ﬁ  xed eﬀects. It appears that omitted country- speciﬁ  c factors may 
be determining the choice of the franchisee ownership governance form, and 
that these same country characteristics may also be correlated with higher 
average labor productivity level (even after controlling for wages, prices, and 
other variables).
Overall, we conclude that (a) execution quality has a negative eﬀect on 
labor productivity—this is as expected as the production of what the Com-158    Francine Lafontaine and Jagadeesh Sivadasan
pany refers to as execution quality involves extra labor costs; (b) outlet age 
beyond the ﬁ  rst year of operation and increases in the number of experi-
enced employees do not have a statistically signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on labor pro-
ductivity; and (c) larger order sizes improve labor productivity. The eﬀect of 
governance form is ambiguous, and the choice of governance form appears 
to be correlated with unobserved country ﬁ  xed eﬀects.
5.4.2    Eﬀect of Labor Regulation on Labor Productivity
As discussed in section 5.2.4, we expect labor regulations to increase the 
eﬀective wage rate faced by the outlets of the Company, and accordingly, 
we expect labor productivity to be higher for outlets located in countries 
with more rigid labor regulations. We present results from investigating the 
impact of labor law regulations on measured labor productivity (equation 
[13]) in table 5.3. Since labor regulations are constant at the country level, 
unlike in table 5.2, we are unable to control for local factors using country 
ﬁ  xed eﬀects in these regressions, and rely instead on region/  season ﬁ  xed 
eﬀects.
The results in table 5.3 are consistent with our expectations.26 In all the 
speciﬁ  cations, we ﬁ  nd that the coeﬃcient on the index of labor regulations 
is positive and signiﬁ  cant. The magnitude of the eﬀects drops as we add 
more controls, especially when we add a control for governance type. Nev-
ertheless, the eﬀect is statistically very signiﬁ  cant, and is also economically 
important. A one standard deviation increase in the labor regulation index 
(0.16) increases labor productivity by 6.1 percent (0.16 × 0.38), using the most 
conservative estimate for the eﬀect of labor regulations (from column [6]).
In columns (6) and (8), we include two additional control variables: the 
log weekly exchange rate and log per capita GDP. Under the various labor 
productivity speciﬁ  cations (e.g., equation [13]), the units in which wages and 
prices are measured do not aﬀect the equation; any scaling factor applied 
to wages is oﬀset if the same factor is applied to output price. Thus, if our 
speciﬁ  cations are valid, our results should be unaﬀected by whether prices 
and wages are measured in local currency units or in U.S. dollars. However, 
if our regressions are misspeciﬁ  ed, the units of measurement may bias our 
results. This is because local outlet-  level decisions may be based on prices 
and wages perceived in local currency units. Because the price and wage 
variables enter the speciﬁ  cation in logarithmic form, one way to control 
for possible biases introduced by ﬂ  uctuations in the weekly exchange rates 
is to include the log of the exchange rate among the regressors, as we do in 
columns [6] and [8]. The log per capita GDP variable moreover controls for 
omitted variables that might be correlated with the income of local consum-
26. A simple table of productivity means across diﬀerent quartiles of the regulation index 
(available on request from the authors) reveals an increasing pattern over the ﬁ  rst three quartiles 
and then a decrease. These unconditional means are likely to be confounded by omitted wage 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.160    Francine Lafontaine and Jagadeesh Sivadasan
ers and that could aﬀect labor productivity and yet also be correlated with 
labor regulations. For example, countries with lower GDP per capita may 
have bad public infrastructure that impacts labor productivity.
The results in columns (6) and (8) indicate that controlling for variations 
in exchange rate and for diﬀerences across countries in per capita income 
does not signiﬁ  cantly aﬀect the coeﬃcient on the labor regulation measure 
(or other variables of interest).27 This in turn suggests that our more basic 
speciﬁ  cations and results capture the main eﬀects of interest in the data.
5.4.3      Impact of Labor Regulations on Labor Demand
The results in table 5.3 conﬁ  rm our expectation that labor regulations 
raise the eﬀective cost of labor. As discussed in section 5.2.4, this eﬀect 
should also be visible in the demand for labor (i.e., in equation [14]). The 
results from examining the labor demand speciﬁ  cation, shown in table 5.4, 
are very consistent with those in table 5.3. Conditional on output, outlets 
in countries with more rigid labor laws hire less labor. As expected from our 
simple model, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients also is similar between the 
two tables. Using the most conservative estimate of   in table 5.4 (0.40), 
and given the interquartile range in the labor regulation (0.31), we ﬁ  nd that 
an increase in the index of labor regulations from the twenty-  ﬁ  fth to the 
seventy- ﬁ  fth percentile is associated with a reduction in conditional labor 
demand of about 12.4 percent.
5.4.4      Impact of Labor Regulations on Output
As discussed in section 5.2.4, to evaluate the eﬀect on output, in addition 
to the coeﬃcient on the labor regulation index   in table 5.3 (or table 5.4), 
we need to obtain production function parameters   (output elasticity with 
respect to labor input) and   (output elasticity with respect to materials), as 
well as an estimate of the elasticity of demand ( ).
The results from estimating the production function parameters follow-
ing the speciﬁ  cation in equation (16) are shown in table 5.5. As mentioned 
earlier, given our data limitations, we control for the amount of capital and 
also for the prices of materials by including store-  year-  month ﬁ  xed eﬀects 
in all speciﬁ  cations. The one exception is column (6), where we include store-
 year- season ﬁ  xed eﬀects to check the robustness of our coeﬃcient estimates. 
Since store- year- month eﬀects would be better controls for store- level capi-
tal and material prices, in what follows we focus on the results from columns 
(1) to (5).
We ﬁ nd a range of estimates for  , from 0.123 to 0.205, depending on the 
set of control variables we include. We ﬁ  nd a much narrower range of values 
for the   parameter, from 0.505 to 0.608. In other words, the   parameter 
27. The lack of signiﬁ  cance of per capita GDP and its lack of impact on other coeﬃcients is 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.164    Francine Lafontaine and Jagadeesh Sivadasan
estimate is not very sensitive to the inclusion or not of various controls. Also, 
results in columns (5) and (6) are similar, indicating that estimates are not 
sensitive to whether we control for store level year-  month or year-  season 
eﬀects. The   and   parameters appear to be reasonable, compared to Cobb-
  Douglas parameter estimates in the production function literature.28
Our production function speciﬁ  cation could potentially be aﬀected by 
endogeneity of input choice, an issue lucidly reviewed in Griliches and 
Mairesse (1997). The availability of very high frequency data allows us to 
control for potential unobserved shocks using very detailed outlet-  period 
ﬁ  xed eﬀects. So long as the remaining residual is unanticipated by the ﬁ  rm, 
the inclusion of detailed ﬁ  xed eﬀects would address the endogeneity issue 
(Griliches and Mairesse 1997). Because we lack data on capital and invest-
ment, implementing the Olley-  Pakes approach is impractical. The need 
for outlet-  period ﬁ  xed eﬀects to control for outlet speciﬁ  c capital further 
makes implementing the Levinsohn-  Petrin, or the more recently proposed 
Ackerberg-  Caves-  Frazer approach, problematic as well. Accordingly, to 
check the robustness of our estimates, we adopt the Blundell and Bond 
(2000) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach that uses suit-
ably lagged input variables (levels for diﬀerenced equations and diﬀerences 
for equations in levels) as instruments. The models that passed speciﬁ  cation 
tests (level speciﬁ  cations with 2 to 3 and 2 to 4 lags of diﬀerenced dependent 
variables as instruments) yielded labor coeﬃcient estimates of 0.181 and 
0.179, which are within the range obtained with our other speciﬁ  cations. 
(The GMM results are available on request from the authors.)
Next we turn to estimating the elasticity of demand in table 5.6. Here, 
the coeﬃcient on the price variable is the elasticity of demand ( ). A key 
issue in demand estimation is omitted- variable bias arising from unobserved 
demand shifters that are correlated with both price and quantity. We address 
this ﬁ  rst by eliminating store- speciﬁ  c eﬀects via diﬀerencing, and then given 
the high-  frequency of our data, we further control for potential demand 
shifters that could induce store-  speciﬁ  c trends over time within months or 
seasons through store- year- season or store- year- month ﬁ  xed eﬀects. In col-
umns (3) and (4), moreover, we restrict our sample to periods such that the 
change in price is more than 5 percent. We do this because, as noted earlier, 
we do not observe output price directly, but instead measure it by dividing 
weekly sales revenue by items sold. Since the latter measure is noisy, in the 
sense that output mix changes are not reﬂ  ected in the “items” variable, some 
of the variation we see in our price data reﬂ  ects changes in output mix at 
the store level instead of real price changes. We assume that our restricted 
samples in columns (3) and (4) are more likely to correctly capture actual 
variation in price and quantity rather than changes in output mix, and in 
that sense the results should yield more valid estimates of  . Finally, as 
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discussed brieﬂ  y in section 5.2.4, an alternative approach to identifying the 
demand elasticity parameter is to use an instrumental variables approach. 
In column (5), we use the average cost of materials per item in outlet i as 
an instrument for price per item at a given store. Note that this instrument 
has the added advantage that it varies with output mix. In column (6), we 
add the average price per item in all other stores in the country-  month cell 
as a second instrument. Here we look at the Hansen’s J overidentiﬁ  cation 
test and cannot reject the null of the validity of the instruments. Note that 
for both columns (5) and (6), the joint signiﬁ  cance of the instruments in the 
ﬁ  rst stage is high, as is the ﬁ  rst- stage Shea’s partial R- square, suggesting that 
our instruments are not weak. Finally, the results imply that material costs 
per item is a more important instrument than price at other outlets. This is 
reassuring given that, as argued previously, our material cost instrument is 
not so subject to the Bresnahan (1996) critique.
Our speciﬁ  cations yield demand elasticity estimates for the entire sample 
ranging from – 1.00 to – 1.08.29 Contrary to the expected eﬀect from omitted 
demand shifters, however, we ﬁ  nd that using instruments here increases the 
magnitude of the estimated elasticity.
Given our estimates of the four key parameters, table 5.7 summarizes the 
range of estimates for the coeﬃcient of labor law regulation per equation 
(15), and accordingly the expected eﬀect of a change in the labor regulation 
index on outlet- level output. In sum, we ﬁ  nd that an increase in labor regula-
tion from the p25 level (   0.28) to p75 level (   0.59) leads to a net reduction 
in outlet level output (conditional on outlet level wages, input prices, capital 
and demand shifters) of 1.53 percent to 2.65 percent if we use our demand 
elasticity estimates, and by up to 5 to 8 percent if we assume that demand 
for the items is inﬁ  nitely elastic. Note that our lower range of estimates is 
close to the 2 percent eﬀect on consumption calibrated by Hopenhayn and 
Rogerson (1993) for a job security tax equivalent to one year’s wages for the 
United States.
5.4.5    Robustness
Our results were obtained using diﬀerent sets of controls and ﬁ  xed eﬀects, 
and in some cases, diﬀerent instruments. We found that our results were 
quite robust to these diﬀerences. In this section we explore two remaining 
issues explicitly.
First, as discussed previously, we relied on wage data not only as a regressor 
in some of our regressions, but also to generate a measure of labor hours per 
outlet per week from our labor cost data. To verify that our results are robust 
29. Note that our estimates of the (short-  run) demand elasticity suggest that outlets are 
operating in the elastic portion of their demand curve, as ﬁ  rms with market power are expected 
to do. This ﬁ  nding, however, is diﬀerent from results obtained in Chintagunta, Dubé, and Singh 
(2003) for supermarkets, and from those of Levitt (2006), which he obtained in the context of 
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to diﬀerent measures of wages, we reproduced our analyses in tables 5.2, 5.3, 
and 5.4 using two alternative measures of wages. The ﬁ  rst was obtained from 
Ashenfelter and Jurajda (2001), which provided data for seventeen countries 
in our sample. We extended this measure to the other countries in our data 
using GDP per capita data from the UN World Development Indicators. 
More precisely, we used a simple model to predict wages based on GDP per 
capita for the remaining countries in our sample.30 The second measure of 
wages we used are minimum wages, from the International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO). For this measure to be valid for our purposes, we must assume that 
wages paid at the outlets are the same as the minimum wage (or equivalently, 
a common multiple of the minimum wage across outlets and countries). We 
found that the signs and magnitudes of our results were broadly robust to 
using these alternative wage data sources, though the statistical signiﬁ  cance 
varied across some speciﬁ  cations. In particular, the estimates obtained with 
these variables were much noisier. For this reason, and because we believe 
that the actual wage data we obtained from our main source were more 
appropriate for our purposes, we chose to focus on the previous results.
Table 5.7   Calibrated eﬀect of labor regulation on output
    Low   High
Parameter ϕ –0.383 –0.400
Parameter   0.123 0.205
Parameter   0.608 0.505
Interquartile range (p75–p25) in index of labor regulation 0.310 0.310






Coeﬃcient on index of labor regulation in equation (15) –0.175 –0.283
Eﬀect of p25 to p75 change in index of labor regulation on output –5.28% –8.39%






Coeﬃcient on index of labor regulation in equation (15) –0.081 –0.146
Eﬀect of p25 to p75 change in index of labor regulation on output –2.48% –4.42%






Coeﬃcient on index of labor regulation in equation (15) –0.050 –0.087
Eﬀect of p25 to p75 change in index of labor regulation on output   –1.53%   –2.65%
30. Regressing wages on GDP per capita yields a very good ﬁ  t—an R-  square of about 85 
percent.168    Francine Lafontaine and Jagadeesh Sivadasan
Second, we examined the eﬀect of another measure of labor market reg-
ulation—a cross-  country index measuring the extent to which minimum 
wage laws impact the operations of business—obtained from the Heritage 
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom database. Since we measure wages 
at the country level, however, using data on average labor cost or a model 
based on GDP, our measure of wages paid by outlets (and hence amount of 
labor) could be systematically downward (upward) biased in countries with 
relatively higher minimum wage standards given that such standards likely 
apply in fast food. Thus, we expect the minimum wage regulation index to 
be positively correlated with measurement error in wages, and hence to be 
positively correlated with equilibrium labor productivity. Our results were 
in line with these expectations—we found that countries with more severe 
minimum wage standards had higher labor productivity levels. Thus, strong 
minimum wage standards appear to have a similar qualitative impact on 
retail food outlets as laws constraining the hiring and ﬁ  ring of workers.31
5.5    Conclusion
In this study, we used weekly data from the outlets of an international 
retail food chain to analyze how labor productivity—deﬁ  ned as the number 
of items produced per worker-  hour—varies with outlet characteristics and 
organizational factors such as experience levels of the workers, average order 
size, governance, execution, and compliance diﬀerences, and a cross- country 
index of the severity of labor regulations.
We found that (a) execution quality has a negative eﬀect on labor pro-
ductivity, as expected; (b) outlet age beyond the ﬁ  rst year of operation and 
increases in the number of experienced employees do not have a statistically 
signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on labor productivity; and (c) larger order sizes improve 
labor productivity. The eﬀect of governance form is ambiguous, and the 
choice of governance form appears to be correlated with unobserved coun-
try ﬁ  xed eﬀects.
Consistent with Company managers’ statements about the importance of 
controlling labor costs in this industry, we also found that labor laws have a 
signiﬁ  cant and economically important positive eﬀect on outlet-  level labor 
productivity in this international fast- food chain, an eﬀect we showed is due 
31. We also redid all our analyses using a measure of the inﬂ  exibility in hiring and ﬁ  ring 
workers obtained from the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) published by the World Eco-
nomic Forum (WEF) in collaboration with the Center for International Development (CID) 
at Harvard University and the Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, Harvard Business 
School. This measure is obtained by surveying managers of multinational ﬁ  rms and hence is 
constructed diﬀerently from the Botero et al. (2004) index that we use (which is based on tabulat-
ing labor laws and regulations across countries). The GCR measure is not highly correlated with 
the index of labor regulation from Botero et al. (2004), and there was no statistically signiﬁ  cant 
eﬀect of labor inﬂ  exibility on outlet level output and labor demand using this measure.Within- ﬁ  rm Labor Productivity across Countries: A Case Study    1 6 9
to the resulting decision of outlets to reduce the amount of labor they use in 
outlets located in countries with more rigid laws. We found that increasing 
the index of labor regulations from the twenty-  ﬁ  fth percentile (   0.28) to 
its seventy- ﬁ  fth percentile level (   0.59) reduces conditional labor demand 
by about 12.4 percent.
Our data set has unusually high frequency (weekly) data on output and 
costs that would not be available in most contexts. We exploit this to address 
some potentially restrictive limitations in the data. The key limitations 
include the lack of direct data on labor (hours), quantity of materials, the 
amount of capital, rental rates, and proﬁ  ts at the outlet level. We also lack 
information on competition/  market structure at the local (outlet) level. In 
particular, our empirical strategy to estimate the eﬀect of labor law rigid-
ity on outlet-  level output utilizes outlet-  year-  season or outlet-  year-  month 
ﬁ  xed eﬀects to condition out unobserved heterogeneity induced by missing 
data. With this approach, we found that an increase in labor regulation from 
its twenty-  ﬁ  fth percentile value (  0.28) to its seventy-  ﬁ  fth percentile level 
(  0.59) leads to a net reduction in outlet- level output (conditional on outlet 
level wages, input prices, capital, and demand shifters) of about 1.5 percent 
to 2.6 percent (using the lowest estimates of demand elasticity, which yield 
the most conservative estimates of the eﬀect on output).
Consistent with these ﬁ  ndings of a negative impact of labor market rigidi-
ties on employment and output, in a companion paper we document that 
these rigidities lead to hysteresis in labor costs for the outlets of this Com-
pany, and speciﬁ  cally reduce the responsiveness of labor costs to changes in 
both output and output price in economically important ways (see Lafon-
taine and Sivadasan 2009). Though we cannot rule out the possibility that 
other factors, including other forms of regulation that might be present 
in markets with high labor regulation, might be aﬀecting the ﬁ  rm’s opera-
tions, our work nevertheless suggests that policies that increase labor market 
rigidities lead to substitution away from labor and cause a net reduction 
in output levels. These eﬀects, moreover, are documented using data from 
existing outlets. If labor regulations aﬀect the proﬁ  tability of the Company’s 
operations, they also likely aﬀect decisions on another margin, namely entry 
and expansion decisions. Discussion with Company oﬃcials and prelimi-
nary analyses suggest that indeed the ﬁ  rm has been slower to enter and has 
established fewer stores in countries with more rigid labor regulations. We 
conclude that the easing of labor market rigidities would likely yield some 
increase in employment and boost output in this industry.170    Francine Lafontaine and Jagadeesh Sivadasan
Appendix
Deﬁ  nition of Employment Laws Index
This index taken from Botero et al. (2004).
Alternative Employment Contracts
Measures the existence and cost of alternatives to the standard employ-
ment contract, computed as the average of: (1) a dummy variable equal to 
one if part- time workers enjoy the mandatory beneﬁ  ts of full- time workers; 
(2) a dummy variable equal to one if terminating part-  time workers is at 
least as costly as terminating full-  time workers; (3) a dummy variable equal 
to one if ﬁ  xed- term contracts are only allowed for ﬁ  xed- term tasks; and (4) 
the normalized maximum duration of ﬁ  xed-  term contracts.
Cost of Increasing Hours Worked
Measures the cost of increasing the number of hours worked. We start by 
calculating the maximum number of “normal” hours of work per year in 
each country (excluding overtime, vacations, holidays, etc.). Normal hours 
range from 1,758 in Denmark to 2,418 in Kenya. Then we assume that ﬁ  rms 
need to increase the hours worked by their employees from 1,758 to 2,418 
hours during one year. A ﬁ  rm ﬁ  rst increases the number of hours worked 
until it reaches the country’s maximum normal hours of work, and then uses 
overtime. If existing employees are not allowed to increase the hours worked 
to 2,418 hours in a year, perhaps because overtime is capped, we assume the 
ﬁ  rm doubles its workforce and each worker is paid 1,758 hours, doubling 
the wage bill of the ﬁ  rm. The cost of increasing hours worked is computed 
as the ratio of the ﬁ  nal wage bill to the initial one.
Cost of Firing Workers
Measures the cost of ﬁ  ring 20 percent of the ﬁ  rm’s workers (10 percent 
are ﬁ  red for redundancy and 10 percent without cause). The cost of ﬁ  ring 
a worker is calculated as the sum of the notice period, severance pay, and 
any mandatory penalties established by law or mandatory collective agree-
ments for a worker with three years of tenure with the ﬁ  rm. If dismissal is 
illegal, we set the cost of ﬁ  ring equal to the annual wage. The new wage bill 
incorporates the normal wage of the remaining workers and the cost of ﬁ  r-
ing workers. The cost of ﬁ  ring workers is computed as the ratio of the new 
wage bill to the old one.
Dismissal Procedures
Measures worker protection granted by law or mandatory collective agree-
ments against dismissal. It is the average of the following seven dummy vari-
ables, which equal one: (1) if the employer must notify a third party before Within- ﬁ  rm Labor Productivity across Countries: A Case Study    1 7 1
dismissing more than one worker; (2) if the employer needs the approval of 
a third party prior to dismissing more than one worker; (3) if the employer 
must notify a third party before dismissing one redundant worker; (4) if 
the employer needs the approval of a third party to dismiss one redundant 
worker; (5) if the employer must provide relocation or retraining alternatives 
for redundant employees prior to dismissal; (6) if there are priority rules 
applying to dismissal or lay-  oﬀs; and (7) if there are priority rules applying 
to reemployment.
Employment Laws Index
Measures the protection of labor and employment laws as the average of: 
(1) alternative employment contracts; (2) cost of increasing hours worked; 
(3) cost of ﬁ  ring workers; and (4) dismissal procedures.
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